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THE NEED FOR UNIFORM LEGAL 
PROTECTION AGAINST CULTURAL 
PROPERTY THEFT: A FINAL CRY FOR THE 
1995 UNIDROIT CONVENTION 
INTRODUCTION 
n 1911, Vincenzo Peruggia shocked the world when he stole Leo-
nardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa from the Louvre museum in Paris, 
marking one of the world’s first major art thefts.1 Almost a century later, 
in 2007, “five armed and masked thieves walked into a museum2 while it 
was open on [a] Sunday afternoon” and stole four pieces of art within 
five minutes.3 In 2008, the world witnessed even more dramatic art 
crime, including “a stolen Caravaggio that turned out to be a fake, gun-
wielding thieves and under-the-table ransoms, and something of a real-
life Thomas Crown affair.”4 
Since the disappearance of the Mona Lisa, cultural property theft has 
become an increasingly prevalent crime in many countries despite incon-
sistent and often misleading statistics.5 Thefts range from large-scale 
museum thefts to smaller thefts from galleries, private homes, and reli-
gious buildings.6 France, for example, with “more than 1,200 museums 
                                                                                                                                  
 1. See Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow of 
Illicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 111, 112 (2008) [hereinafter Fincham, 
Lex Originis Rule]. Authorities recovered the painting two years later, and the thief “was 
tried and convicted.” Id. (citing SEYMOUR V. REIT, THE DAY THEY STOLE THE MONA LISA 
(1981)). 
 2. The museum is located in Nice, France. 
 3. Maia de la Baume, Four Masterworks Stolen From a French Museum, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at E2. The police reported that the stolen works were Claude Mo-
net’s “Cliffs Near Dieppe,” Alfred Sisley’s “Lane of Poplars at Moret-sur-Loing,” and 
Jan Brueghel the Elder’s “Allegory of Water” and “Allegory of Earth.” The French police 
were able to recover these pieces in June of 2008. French Police Recover Stolen Monet 
Painting, MSNBC (June 4, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24973627. 
 4. Noah Charney, 2008 in Review: Art Crimes of the Year, ARTINFO (Dec. 30, 
2008), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/29907/2008-in-review-art-crimes-of-the-year/ 
[hereinafter Charney, Art Crimes of the Year]. The article lists the five largest art crimes 
that occurred in 2008, discussing thefts in Sao Paulo, Brazil; Zurich, Switzerland; Van-
couver, Canada; Odessa, Ukraine; and London, England. 
 5. For a discussion concerning issues with art theft statistics, see Mark Durney, Art 
Theft Statistics: Valuable Tools in Need of Reliable Measures, 1 CULTURAL HERITAGE & 
ARTS REV. 13 (2010). Durney explains that “there have been few comprehensive efforts 
to collect and interpret statistics,” and statistics “only present a reflection of the incidents 
registered with, or reported to law enforcement.” Id. at 13. In addition, INTERPOL’s data 
between 2003 and 2008 reflects a decrease in the number of thefts reported by certain 
countries, yet the data is incomplete and thus somewhat misleading. Id. at 14. 
 6. See generally Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 112. 
I 
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across the country as well as hundreds of churches [with] valuable works 
of art,” faces an astonishing amount of art crime each year, constantly 
prompting authorities to contemplate increases in security and methods 
of deterrence.7 Further, cultural property theft creates additional prob-
lems when it is “perpetrated by or on behalf of organized crime syndi-
cates and used to fund other illicit activities, such as drugs or arms 
trades.”8 Today in France, one of the most art-rich and most art-theft-
plagued countries, almost 38,000 works of art are missing, “of which 
3,444 are known to have been destroyed and 145 reported stolen,” with 
the remainder simply lost or unreported.9 
Although cultural property theft in France is particularly noticeable, 
France exemplifies only a small part of an expanding global problem,10 
and most countries have at some point been plagued by this problem and 
have sought to address it through various treaties or legislation. Several 
international treaties provide guidelines for the implementation of cultur-
al property laws; however, despite these treaties’ potential for success, 
law enforcement agencies and private organizations throughout the world 
are “limited by imperfect information and unclear guidelines.”11 As a 
result, countries maintain their own legislation12 instead of relying on an 
international regime, and no uniform law has been implemented. How-
ever, though some national legislation comports with existing treaty rec-
ommendations, the lack of uniformity among nations often results in in-
consistent and inadequate regulation.13 While the importance of protect-
                                                                                                                                  
 7. France Plans Tighter Security After Art Thefts, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2007), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/hollywood/idINL1388223520070913. 
 8. Charney, Art Crimes of the Year, supra note 4. The article further claims that art 
crime “has become the third-highest-grossing world criminal trade over the past 40 
years.” Id. 
 9. Adam Sage, Artful Dodgers: Men from the Ministries Mislay Heritage of France, 
TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2009), 
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/visual_arts/article5622
135.ece. 
 10. As mentioned before, because France has so many museums, galleries and 
churches, it is particularly prone to art theft. This Note only uses France as an example of 
how one small country can be so affected by this problem. 
 11. Molly A. Torsen, Note, Fine Art in Dark Corners: Goals and Realities of Interna-
tional Cultural Property Protection as Switzerland Implements the 1970 UNESCO Con-
vention, 8 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2005). 
 12. For example, the U.S. has implemented legislation in accordance with an interna-
tional treaty protecting cultural property, but it has also implemented a criminal statute. 
See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, infra note 86, and National 
Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2006). 
 13. The UNESCO Convention does not require that member countries implement all 
provisions of the treaty. Rather, countries are free to choose which provisions and guide-
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ing cultural property is not in dispute, theft remains an increasing inter-
national problem. 
Throughout the past century, international efforts have become increa-
singly focused on protecting cultural property, namely through interna-
tional treaties. In 1970, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) Convention on the Means of Prohi-
biting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property14 was implemented in order to provide protec-
tion of cultural property during peacetime.15 The UNESCO Convention 
was relatively well received and widely ratified, and the U.S., for exam-
ple, implemented cultural property laws both in accordance with and in-
dependent of the UNESCO framework. However, the UNESCO Conven-
tion was somewhat short-lived, as the International Institute for the Un-
ification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) created a new treaty intended to 
replace the UNESCO Convention: the 1995 Convention on Stolen or 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,16 which to date remains the most 
recent international treaty concerning cultural property. 
Although many large market countries, such as the United States, are 
still not signatories, this Note recognizes the potential of the UNIDROIT 
Convention for providing a successful, uniform framework through 
which cultural property can be protected. As the UNIDROIT Convention 
allows no reservations except those expressly stated within the treaty, 
countries must implement all or none of the provisions, resulting in a 
uniform law among member countries that could protect cultural proper-
ty and minimize the problems that arise from inconsistent or incompre-
hensive regulation. Thus, this Note maintains that countries must work 
collectively and promote the creation of uniform law, as provided by the 
UNIDROIT Convention, in order to successfully decrease theft and pro-
tect cultural property. 
                                                                                                                                  
lines they will use, and thus the resulting legislation is not uniform. See UNESCO Con-
vention, infra note 14. 
 14. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. 
 15. Another convention was enacted prior to the 1970 UNESCO Convention with the 
purpose of protecting cultural property in wartime. See Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [he-
reinafter Hague Convention]. 
 16. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on Stolen or 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter 
UNIDROIT Convention]. 
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Part I distinguishes cultural property theft from other art crimes and 
surveys its effects on the international community.17 Part II examines the 
developments of the international treaties mentioned above,18 comparing 
them and examining how they define cultural property.19 Parts III and IV 
provide an analysis of the UNESCO Convention and the U.S. imple-
menting legislation, focusing specifically on how each has been unsuc-
cessful in several respects.20 Finally, Part V addresses the UNIDROIT 
Convention, concluding that global accession to the treaty, and thus im-
plementation of uniform international law, is the most realistic hope for 
success in decreasing cultural property theft.21 Although some countries 
have expressed concern over certain aspects of the treaty and critics ar-
gue that widespread implementation is unlikely,22 its clear guidelines 
provide a uniform framework for the protection of cultural property that 
is of utmost importance. As such, despite its lack of extensive support to 
date, the treaty may provide the best available solution to this ongoing 
worldwide problem, and countries should support the protection of cul-
tural property by signing on to the UNIDROIT Convention.23 
                                                                                                                                  
 17. Four different art crimes will be defined, but the focus of this Note is on cultural 
property theft and its effects throughout the international community. Each of the differ-
ent art crimes mentioned have slightly different effects, but the solution proposed in this 
Note, namely encouraging countries to accede to the UNIDROIT Convention, would 
have an effect on all art crimes. 
 18. This Note does not fully discuss the 1954 Hague Convention, which was imple-
mented for the protection of cultural property during wartime. Because the 1954 Hague 
Convention is not fully applicable today and has been largely replaced by the UNESCO 
Convention, it is not relevant to the discussion here. See further explanation infra note 34. 
 19. This Note discusses only the legislation that has resulted in the U.S. from the 
UNESCO Convention: the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. As 
many market countries, including the U.S., have still declined to ratify the UNIDROIT 
Convention, there is no implementing legislation to discuss at this point. 
 20. Christopher D. Cutting, Comment, Protecting Cultural Property Through Prove-
nance, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 943, 969 (2009). 
 21. Although scholars and critics have made many suggestions to help minimize art 
theft internationally, the UNIDROIT Convention appears to have the greatest potential 
for success. 
 22. See discussion infra Part V. 
 23. While the examination and analysis within this Note focus mainly on the U.S. 
legislation with respect to cultural property, this Note recognizes that similar problems 
plague almost all other legal systems. 
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I. ART CRIME: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The FBI estimates that the art market faces losses of up to six billion 
dollars per year from the “looming criminal enterprise” of art crime.24 
Vandalism, forgery, antiquities looting, and art theft are the four main art 
crimes affecting the market today, and although they encompass various 
sub-categories, they are all “premeditated criminal activities” that target 
cultural property.25 Art vandalism, broadly characterized by destruction 
of art, is an act of violence targeting specific objects that “the public 
holds dear.”26 Art forgery, or art deception, “encompasses a range of 
confidence tricks that involve the premeditated misattribution of art for 
profit.”27 Although art forgery has historically been part of a smaller 
market, art forgery cases have also been known to extend to “high-
profile, multi-million dollar forgeries . . . [and] mass market fakes.”28 
Antiquities looting, which accounts for up to seventy-five percent of all 
art crime, deals with objects taken from both the ocean and land that are 
not accounted for and do not appear on stolen art databases or regi-
stries.29 This crime is often particularly difficult to trace and control, as 
“countries strain to keep native artifacts within their national borders, 
[while] the international demand for antiquities pulls them into the art 
market.”30 
Art theft, or cultural property theft, which is the subject of this Note, is 
one of the most troublesome art crimes plaguing the international art 
market. Historically, cultural property theft has had a different influence 
on the art market than other art crimes, as the high-profile nature of art 
makes it almost impossible to sell in the regular market.31 Despite many 
attempts to decrease the amount of crime, many countries have faced “a 
flourishing of dramatic and devastating instances of art theft,” making it 
                                                                                                                                  
 24. See Art Theft, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/arttheft/arttheft.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 25. Noah Charney, Buyer Beware: Four Major Art Crimes and How They Affect the 
Market, ARTINFO (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/28263/buyer-
beware/ [hereinafter Charney, Buyer Beware]. 
 26. M.J. Williams, Note, Framing Art Vandalism: A Proposal to Address Violence 
Against Art, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 581, 581–82 (2009). 
 27. Charney, Buyer Beware, supra note 25. 
 28. Joseph C. Gioconda, Can Intellectual Property Laws Stem the Rising Tide of Art 
Forgeries?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 47, 56 (2008). 
 29. Charney, Buyer Beware, supra note 25. 
 30. Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal 
Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 377 (1995). 
 31. Charney, Buyer Beware, supra note 25. 
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“one of the most prolific international crimes.”32 Further, although inter-
national efforts have consistently attempted to decrease illicit art trade 
and deter theft of cultural property, “[c]ompeting national policies of art-
importing and art-exporting countries have weakened attempts to gain 
world support for international agreements governing stolen property 
cases.”33 While the UNESCO Convention34 and the subsequent 
UNIDROIT Convention have attempted to better protect cultural proper-
ty, making theft “a clear violation of international law,” cultural property 
theft remains a problem.35 
Cultural property theft, on both a small and large scale, leads to even 
more complex and long-term problems, specifically when cultural prop-
erty disputes arise between “an original owner and a subsequent good-
faith possessor.”36 Default laws that apply to real property also apply to 
art theft cases, and unfortunately, “these rules regularly offer little or no 
assistance, [so] many claimants have resorted to seeking resolution of 
their claims through non-legal means.”37 Specifically, these legal rules 
often treat cultural property the same way they treat any object, without 
regard to the special importance or value of the property.38 Even more 
problematic is that, although some disputes actually proceed to litigation, 
resolving the issues can prove difficult as “both parties are often relative 
innocents” and the “lack of harmony [between the laws of separate legal 
systems] not only ensures that no overarching policy choices will be fur-
thered, but it also prevents parties from anticipating legal outcomes.”39 
                                                                                                                                  
 32. Paige L. Margules, Note, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Ex-
port of Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 609, 609–10 (1992). 
 33. Claudia Fox, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 229 (1993). Fox discusses the UNIDROIT 
Convention pre-ratification. However, several provisions changed as drafts were pro-
posed, and the final treaty, as of 1995, is different in certain respects. 
 34. Again, this Note focuses on both the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions, but 
it does not delve into an explanation of the Hague Convention. For a relevant discussion, 
see id. at 246–48. 
 35. Cutting, supra note 20, at 949. 
 36. Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 111. 
 37. Id. at 112. 
 38. However, the UNIDROIT Convention provides a new status for cultural property, 
separating it from regular goods. See infra note 44. 
 39. Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 113–14 (explaining that 
“[u]nderlying each dispute are the competing claims of two relative innocents, making it 
‘impossible for the law to mete out exact justice’”). Fincham also discusses that the “de-
fault legal rules” dealing with these situations “have created a myriad of potential out-
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Although criminal laws are rarely successful in deterring cultural prop-
erty theft, attempts to solve the issues surrounding cultural property still 
tend to ignore other potential solutions and instead hone in on how crim-
inal law may affect or decrease illicit trade.40 Accordingly, a more uni-
form system, in many major market countries such as the U.S., is neces-
sary in order to increase progress and significantly reduce illicit trade and 
theft.41 As it addresses all of these issues, the UNIDROIT Convention 
would harmonize law among member states, create a separate status for 
cultural property, and provide a uniform system through which to protect 
cultural property. 
II. A BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY 
AGREEMENTS AND DEFINING CULTURAL PROPERTY 
International law has historically focused on the importance of main-
taining and protecting cultural property, yet despite this concern, many 
legal systems have still failed to significantly decrease theft.42 Different 
international treaties have “shaped and governed” how countries protect 
cultural property,43 yet these treaties are by no means infallible and prob-
lems constantly arise. The UNESCO Convention was one of the first ma-
jor treaties to pose solutions for protecting cultural property,44 and it 
                                                                                                                                  
comes; which ultimately makes securing historic sites, and safeguarding collections from 
theft more difficult.” Id. 
 40. Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Criminal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit Cul-
tural Property are Ineffective, and a Pragmatic Alternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 597, 598 (2007) [hereinafter Fincham, Federal Criminal Penalties]. Fincham focuses 
specifically on cultural property debates within the U.S. 
 41. Id. at 599, stating that “[w]ithout a well-ordered system which allows dealers and 
purchasers to deal in legitimate objects, the criminal penalties [of the U.S.] will never 
serve their stated goal . . . .” Although the context of the article is limited to a comparison 
with the U.K., a more well-ordered system could better serve all countries. 
 42. As will be discussed throughout this Note, a great deal of international treaties 
and national legislation exist, but various flaws have prevented their success. 
 43. Katherine D. Vitale, Note, The War on Antiquities: United States Law and For-
eign Cultural Property, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835, 1838 (2009). However, Vitale 
focuses mainly on how the U.S. law regarding cultural property has been shaped by the 
UNESCO Convention. 
 44. Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures, 5 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 33 (1998). 
The General Conference concluded that international cooperation was one of 
the most efficient ways to protect each country’s cultural property from the 
dangers that could result from the illicit transfer of such property. Therefore, 
parties to the convention agreed to oppose all illicit import, export, and transfer 
of ownership of cultural property . . . . 
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mandated that member parties “protect the cultural property of other 
member states through national legislation and international coopera-
tion.”45 However, despite its guidelines for implementing potentially 
successful legislation, the UNESCO Convention has proved largely un-
successful, and, as a result, in 1995 UNIDROIT formulated the 
UNIDROIT Convention with the intent to replace the earlier UNESCO 
Convention.46 Although these two treaties have been met with both criti-
cism and praise, neither treaty has been ratified by many large market 
countries.47 Despite this reception, however, the UNIDROIT Convention 
requires uniform law among member parties, which will likely prove far 
more successful in the international market than the UNESCO Conven-
tion has proven. 
One benefit of adopting the uniform law under UNIDROIT is the clari-
fication of the definition of cultural property. Currently, international 
treaties and national legislation provide varying classifications,48 and 
pinpointing one definition is often difficult as it can be “tempting to de-
fine cultural property as including only chattels, limited to art and histor-
ic relics.”49 Cultural property possesses both objective and subjective 
qualities, making a universal definition of the term even more problemat-
ic.50 For example, some cultures might consider very untraditional works 
of art to be “culturally significant,” while others might not recognize any 
cultural or artistic value in those particular objects.51 Thus, defining cul-
                                                                                                                                  
Id. at 33–34. 
 45. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1839. 
 46. See Jennifer H. Lehman, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural Property: 
The Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention, and the UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 
14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 543–44 (1997); see also Fox, supra note 33, at 230. 
 47. As of January 2011, the U.S. and many other market countries are still not signa-
tories to the UNIDROIT Convention, but the U.S. is a party to the UNESCO Convention. 
 48. See Spencer A. Kinderman, Comment, The UNIDROIT Draft Convention on 
Cultural Objects: An Examination of the Need for a Uniform Legal Framework for Con-
trolling the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 7 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 457, 465–67 
(1993). Although “stolen” and “illegally exported” cultural property are often classified 
within one category, this Note is concerned with art theft and thus focuses on the issues 
surrounding stolen cultural property. 
 49. Edward M. Cottrell, Comment, Keeping the Barbarians Outside the Gate: To-
ward a Comprehensive International Agreement Protecting Cultural Property, 9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 627, 628 (2009). Cottrell further explains that this limited view of cultural prop-
erty is “clearly inadequate” and far too limited, as it would neglect all types of immova-
ble pieces of cultural heritage, such as “the Parthenon, cave drawings, [and] the Bamiyan 
Buddhas.” Id. 
 50. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 515–16. 
 51. Id. Kinderman provides an example: 
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tural property subjectively and giving “states complete deference to de-
fine objects that possess ‘cultural significance’” allows for a serious lack 
of uniformity.52 In defining “cultural property,” the UNESCO Conven-
tion focuses on whether “an object possesses one of several universally 
recognized ‘cultural’ characteristics.”53 Specifically, it states, “the term 
‘cultural property’ means property which, on religious or secular 
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance 
for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science.”54 Some-
what similarly, the UNIDROIT Convention defines cultural objects as 
“those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance for arc-
haeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and belong to one 
of the categories listed in the Annex to this Convention.”55 These two 
definitions contain the same list of cultural property sub-categories, yet 
UNIDROIT attempts to create a more uniform definition between mem-
ber states by eliminating the language of the UNESCO Convention that 
permits “each State” to assign importance to specific cultural objects. 
This is particularly important as it eliminates the potential for subjective 
definitions, instead providing a more consistent framework through 
which cultural property may be classified by each signatory.56 
III. 1970 UNESCO CONVENTION 
Importation of illegally obtained artifacts became increasingly proble-
matic in the 1960s,57 and thus the UNESCO Convention “was the end 
                                                                                                                                  
[C]onsider a rock that is an item of extreme religious importance to the natives 
of a small Pacific island. The rock itself does not possess any overt artistic cha-
racteristics; to any other culture it is just a rock. Yet, on a subjective level it 
possesses great cultural significance to the islanders. 
Id. at 516. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 515. 
 54. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 1 (emphasis added). More specifically, 
Article 1 lists eleven categories of cultural property, including several subcategories. 
 55. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 2. The Annex to the UNIDROIT 
Convention lists the same categories of “cultural property” as are listed in the UNESCO 
Convention. Id. annex. 
 56. John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
339, 341 (1989). This Note does not discuss archaeological pieces, although this category 
of cultural property is extremely expansive. While several expansive definitions exist, 
most scholars and critics refer to cultural property as “objects that embody the culture—
principally archaeological, ethnographical and historical objects, works of art, and archi-
tecture,” but the category can also include “almost anything made or changed by man.” 
Id. 
 57. See Phelan, supra note 44, at 33. 
760 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:2 
product of a long line of efforts to stop the pillaging and looting of arc-
haeological sites, and the theft of cultural property of extreme impor-
tance.”58 The treaty focuses on garnering international cooperation to 
ensure that cultural property remains in its origin country or is lawfully 
exported,59 and it “envisions cultural property as a part of a national cul-
tural heritage”60 that must be protected. The main tenet of the UNESCO 
Convention is to “give international effect to national” issues through a 
list of “non-self-executing obligations” that demand national implement-
ing legislation by each member party.61 Thus, the Preamble to the treaty 
“propounds the legal principle that cultural property belongs to human-
kind and involves the moral obligation of all nations to protect human 
cultural heritage.”62 Further, stating as one of its considerations “that it is 
incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing with-
in its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and 
illicit export,”63 the UNESCO Convention aims to create a framework 
through which member parties can enact legislation that protects cultural 
property.64 Although it has received much criticism and has not been 
overly successful, the UNESCO Convention remains the “primary inter-
national instrument that addresses the international movement of, and 
market in, cultural materials.”65 
The UNESCO Convention provisions are each aimed toward providing 
expansive protection of cultural property, and, as mentioned earlier, Ar-
ticle 1 allows member states to designate specific items of cultural im-
portance.66 Article 3 mandates that “the import, export or transfer of 
ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions 
adopted under this Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be illi-
                                                                                                                                  
 58. Lehman, supra note 46, at 539 (quoting Lyndel V. Prott, International Control of 
Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and Some 
Possible Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 339 (1983)). 
 59. See Phelan, supra note 44, at 33. 
 60. Id. at 34. 
 61. Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends Toward a Lib-
eral Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1067, 1077 (2005). Siehr 
quotes the treaty, stating that it obliges “the state parties ‘to prevent museums and similar 
institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural property originating in another 
State Party which has been illegally exported’ and ‘to recover and return any such cultur-
al property imported.’” Id. (quoting UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, arts. 7(a), 
7(b)(ii)). 
 62. Lehman, supra note 46, at 540. 
 63. UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, pmbl. 
 64. See Fox, supra note 33, at 248–49. 
 65. Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille Roussin, International Cultural Property, 41 INT’L 
LAW 613, 613 (2007). 
 66. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 1. 
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cit,”67 and Article 6 further imposes upon parties an “obligation to intro-
duce an authorization certificate that would accompany an item of cul-
tural property being exported and that would show that the export of the 
item in question was authorized.”68 Interestingly, when Articles 3 and 6 
are read together, they “should have significant bite, for their combined 
result make it illegal for any state party to import any work of art or any 
other item of cultural property unless the export of that item was specifi-
cally authorized by the state of origin party.”69 
Despite its many signatories and the UNESCO Convention’s attempt at 
clear prohibition of “the importation of cultural property illegally ex-
ported or stolen from a foreign nation,”70 the treaty has had a marginal 
effect.71 First, many provisions are “mere rhetoric and thus impose no 
real requirements on signatories.”72 Article 2 is particularly demonstra-
tive of this problem, as it generally requires that “the states signing the 
Convention will oppose illicit import, export, and other types of transac-
tions ‘with the means at their disposal.’”73 Further, Article 2 “essentially 
sets forth the principle that illicit trade in cultural property is undesirable, 
that it deprives source countries of their cultural heritage and rightful 
property, and that international cooperation is an effective means of con-
trolling the problem,”74 yet no substantive requirements are provided. As 
a result, there has been little international motivation to implement 
                                                                                                                                  
 67. Id. art. 3. 
 68. Joseph F. Edwards, Major Global Treaties for the Protection and Enjoyment of 
Art and Cultural Objects, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 919, 927 (1991). Article 6 states: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake: (a) To introduce an appropri-
ate certificate in which the exporting State would specify that the export of the 
cultural property in question is authorized. The certificate should accompany 
all items of cultural property exported in accordance with the regulations; (b) to 
prohibit the exportation of cultural property from their territory unless accom-
panied by the above-mentioned export certificate; (c) to publicize this prohibi-
tion by appropriate means, particularly among persons likely to export or im-
port cultural property. 
UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 6. 
 69. Edwards, supra note 68, at 928. 
 70. Fox, supra note 33, at 249. 
 71. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 460. 
 72. Nina R. Lenzner, Comment, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: 
Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of 
the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 469, 479–80 (1994). 
 73. Id. at 480 (citing UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 2). 
 74. Id. 
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UNESCO Convention legislation in response to theft and illegal export 
of cultural property.75 
In addition, many scholars argue that the UNESCO Convention favors 
source nations too heavily, so many market nations76 declined to ratify 
it.77 These large market countries are not signatories “because of a gener-
al reluctance to restrict their art markets”78 and negatively impact their 
economies, but “without the presence of some international source of law 
binding the art-market nations . . . art-exporting countries have little 
chance of combating the problem of the illicit trade in works of art.”79 
Thus, the imbalance between large and small market member countries 
impacts the potential for the UNESCO Convention to succeed. 
Further, although many countries have domestic cultural property laws, 
the laws do not always successfully deal with cultural property theft be-
cause they are inconsistent and ignore the international scale of the 
crime. This problem is further perpetuated by the UNESCO Convention 
framework, which, rather than promoting “adherence to a uniform set of 
laws . . . permits individual countries to maintain their own import and 
export regulations as well as laws regarding restitution of stolen proper-
ty.”80 At least in part, the failure of the UNESCO Convention to demand 
a uniform framework of law has contributed to a lack of improvement in 
the protection of cultural property.81 Perhaps most importantly is that the 
UNESCO Convention, unlike the UNIDROIT Convention, does not re-
quire that member parties implement all of the treaty’s provisions. Ac-
cordingly, the treaty allows for creation of widely differing legislation, 
which in turn perpetuates the problem of cultural property theft. 
Although it has faced criticism,82 positive attributes of the UNESCO 
Convention are noteworthy. For example, although it may favor source 
                                                                                                                                  
 75. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 461. 
 76. The U.S. is an exception. 
 77. Brian Bengs, Note, Dead on Arrival? A Comparison of the Unidroit Convention 
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and U.S. Property Law, 6 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503, 508 (1996). 
 78. Lehman, supra note 46, at 540 (quoting William D. Montalbano, Big Business: 
Art Thieves Find Italy is a Gold Mine, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1988, at A1). 
 79. Lenzner, supra note 72, at 479. 
 80. Lehman, supra note 46, at 543 (citing Kinderman, supra note 48, at 470). 
 81. However, this failure to require a uniform law is perhaps why so many countries 
have agreed to sign on, knowing that they can implement legislation independent of the 
legislation of other countries. This creates a type of cycle that can only be avoided by 
implementing uniform law. See generally Kinderman, supra note 48. 
 82. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1842. For example, some critics argue that the UNESCO 
Convention is a “failure because too few of the States Parties to the Convention adopted 
implementing national legislation . . . [and] [t]oday, critics point to the fact that the 1970 
2011] CULTURAL PROPERTY THEFT AND UNIDROIT 763 
countries, the treaty does permit “market countries and source countries 
to communicate and cooperate for the protection and return of cultural 
property through diplomatic channels and domestic legislation,”83 and it 
has facilitated several “successful repatriations of cultural property.”84 
Further, some major market countries have ratified the treaty and created 
implementing legislation, including Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom,85 demonstrating a desire to better protect their cultural heritag-
es. The U.S. is one of the market nations to also ratify the treaty, and its 
implementing legislation remains in effect today.86 However, despite 
some of the UNESCO Convention successes, its shortcomings demand 
further consideration. 
Generally, while the UNESCO Convention may have been successful 
in some respects, it does not provide for uniform law, allows member 
parties to maintain individual regulations,87 does not require acceptance 
of all provisions, and has not been regarded positively or ratified by 
many market nations.88 As such, the UNIDROIT Convention as a whole 
provides a greater potential for successfully deterring and decreasing cul-
tural property theft. 
IV. UNITED STATES PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: THE 
CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY IMPLEMENTATION ACT 
Although cultural property theft is a problem throughout the global 
market, U.S. law is particularly important because the U.S. is one of the 
largest consumers of cultural property.89 Two statutes in the U.S. address 
individuals who deal in stolen cultural property:90 the National Stolen 
Property Act (“NSPA”)91 and the Archaeological Resources Protection 
                                                                                                                                  
UNESCO Convention has no retroactive protections, and therefore, does not apply to 
cultural property stolen or illegally exported before November 1970.” Id. 
 83. While some scholars believe that this is a positive aspect of the UNESCO Con-
vention, others disagree. This Note focuses on this disagreement, arguing that uniform 
law would be much more effective in protecting cultural property than allowing for indi-
vidual domestic legislation. 
 84. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1842. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2613 (2010). 
 87. Lehman, supra note 46, at 543. 
 88. See Vitale, supra note 43, at 1842. 
 89. See Cutting, supra note 20, at 944. 
 90. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1836. 
 91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2010). 
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Act (“ARPA”),92 and both were implemented to “prosecute individuals 
who buy, sell, or otherwise deal in cultural property stolen or illegally 
exported from a foreign state.”93 Although some critics argue that the 
two statutes conflict with the U.S. implementation of the UNESCO Con-
vention, courts have found this argument unpersuasive and the statutes 
are still in effect.94 
However, the main U.S. law focused on cultural property protection is 
the U.S. UNESCO Convention implementing legislation, the Convention 
on Cultural Property Implementation Act (“CPIA”),95 which was passed 
primarily because Congress recognized that “the United States was ripe 
for illegal import of items of cultural property.”96 Although the U.S. rati-
fied the treaty in 1972, it did not pass the CPIA until 1983, though it was 
the first market nation to implement the UNESCO Convention.97 Before 
it became a party to the treaty, the U.S. had not significantly addressed 
the problems concerning cultural property theft and illegally exported 
cultural property,98 but currently the NSPA, ARPA, and CPIA exist as 
the primary means for dealing with cultural property theft in the U.S.99 
The CPIA provisions were designed to parallel the main goals of the 
UNESCO Convention,100 and one of the most notable aims of the CPIA 
is the prohibition against any “import of cultural material identified as 
stolen from an institution in another state party to the UNESCO Conven-
                                                                                                                                  
 92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2010). For a further discussion on relevant aspects 
of ARPA, see Vitale, supra note 43, at 1855–58. 
 93. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1837. 
 94. Id.; see also United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); Fincham, Fed-
eral Criminal Penalties, supra note 40, at 618, explaining that “Schultz raised three ar-
guments in support of his appeal . . . (2) the enactment of the Cultural Property Imple-
mentation Act of 1983 preempts the prosecution under the NSPA . . .” but “the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals found the arguments unpersuasive.” Id. 
 95. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2010). 
 96. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1843. 
 97. Id. at 1842 n.44. 
 98. Lehman, supra note 46, at 539. 
 99. Although the NSPA and ARPA legislation are extremely important for the protec-
tion of cultural property in the U.S., this Note focuses on the international treaties in 
place and their resulting legislation. Thus, a discussion of these two statutes is not in-
cluded. 
 100. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1844. Vitale states that the three purposes of CPIA are 
to prohibit the import of documented cultural material stolen from the museum 
or similar institution of a state party to the [Convention]; to assist in that prop-
erty’s recovery and return if it is found in the United States; and to apply spe-
cific import controls to archaeological or ethnological materials that compose a 
part of a state’s cultural patrimony in danger of being pillaged. 
Id. 
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tion.”101 Additionally, an important result of the CPIA has been the crea-
tion of the Cultural Property Advisory Committee (“CPAC”).102 This 
committee, comprised of cultural property professionals,103 convenes 
when a country requests U.S. assistance in protecting its cultural property 
under the UNESCO Convention.104 The CPAC reviews requests from 
countries seeking import restrictions, and it makes recommendations re-
garding the laws for import and export of cultural property.105 Some 
scholars assert that the CPAC is the CPIA’s “most effective [element] 
insofar as it fosters continuing study, debate and vigilance over the legal 
landscape as it relates to cultural property.”106 
However, aside from the CPAC, the CPIA has faced much criticism 
and it has not had a noticeably significant effect on cultural property pro-
tection. First, although it purports to reflect the main tenets of the 
UNESCO Convention, the CPIA only implements Articles 7 and 9.107 
Although Articles 7108 and 9109 are significant provisions, the U.S. deci-
                                                                                                                                  
 101. Torsen, supra note 11, at 8. 
 102. 19 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 103. See Torsen, supra note 11, at 10 (“The CPAC, which is comprised of museum 
professionals, archaeologists, anthropologists, gallery owners, and other people affiliated 
with cultural property professions, is a very powerful entity and its recommendations are 
usually determinative.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Vitale, supra note 43, at 1846. 
In order to enter into a bilateral agreement, the President or his designee must 
make four determinations: (1) that the cultural patrimony of the foreign state is 
in jeopardy; (2) that the foreign state has attempted to protect its cultural patri-
mony; (3) that import controls on the objects requested by the foreign state 
would substantially benefit the deterrence of their pillage; and (4) that import 
controls are “consistent with the general interest of the international community 
in the interchange of cultural property among nations. 
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 2602(a)). 
 106. Torsen, supra note 11, at 10. 
 107. See Lenzner, supra note 72, at 487. 
 108. Article 7 states: 
The States Parties to this Convention undertake: (a) To take the necessary 
measures, consistent with national legislation, to prevent museums and similar 
institutions within their territories from acquiring cultural property originating 
in another State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force of 
this Convention, in the States concerned. Whenever possible, to inform a State 
of origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such cultural property illegally 
removed from that State after the entry into force of this Convention in both 
States; (b) (i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum 
or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another State 
Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for the 
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sion to only implement these two articles demonstrates the potential for 
problems to arise among nations who choose to implement different pro-
visions; for example, one can foresee instances in which countries’ non-
UNESCO provisions conflict with other countries’ UNESCO-
implementing provisions, or vice versa. Further, among several other 
noteworthy “deficiencies” is the concern that the statute as a whole re-
stricts the Unites States’ assistance under the CPIA to countries that have 
similar UNESCO Convention implementing legislation.110 As a result, 
many countries that might benefit from the CPIA are banned from re-
ceiving any U.S. assistance under the statute because they have not rati-
fied the treaty.111 Further, the language of the CPIA suggests that it only 
applies to state-run museums, allowing “private institutions [to] escape 
scrutiny.”112 Finally, although the CPIA “establishes clear policy regard-
ing cultural property imported into the United States,” providing at least 
some notice to foreign states regarding “steps they need to take in order 
                                                                                                                                  
States concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to 
the inventory of that institution; (ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to 
take appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported 
after the entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned, provided, 
however, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent 
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property. Requests for re-
covery and return shall be made through diplomatic offices. The requesting 
Party shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other evidence neces-
sary to establish its claim for recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no 
customs duties or other charges upon cultural property returned pursuant to this 
Article. All expenses incident to the return and delivery of the cultural property 
shall be borne by the requesting Party. 
UNESCO Convention, supra note 14, art. 7. 
 109. Article 9 states: 
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy 
from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other 
States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention under-
take, in these circumstances, to participate in a concerted international effort to 
determine and to carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the con-
trol of exports and imports and international commerce in the specific materials 
concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take provisional 
measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural 
heritage of the requesting State. 
Id. art. 9. 
 110. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602(a), 2603(c) (2010). 
 111. Torsen, supra note 11, at 9. 
 112. See id. for a further discussion on this aspect of the CPIA. 
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to obtain U.S. protection of their cultural property,”113 the statute has 
made little progress in truly decreasing the amount of crime. 
The U.S. “inconsistent treatment of cultural property” is noticeable 
through its varying legal remedies.114 Although the CPIA, through 
UNESCO guidelines, attempts to protect cultural property, it has been 
seriously criticized,115 especially because it ignores other UNESCO 
Convention provisions and “applies only to property imported from cer-
tain nations.”116 Although the importance of protecting cultural property 
is clear to national policymakers and the international community, do-
mestic “laws are [as] strikingly inconsistent”117 as international legal re-
medies. Accordingly, the U.S. should serve as a model to other countries 
by recognizing the importance of uniform international law, which the 
UNIDROIT Convention promotes, while also encouraging member par-
ties to work together to protect cultural property. 
V.1995 UNIDROIT CONVENTION 
After the UNESCO Convention proved unsuccessful in many respects, 
UNESCO requested that UNIDROIT draft a new, “more efficient” and 
effective treaty.118 In 1986, UNIDROIT began to reexamine the issues 
addressed by the UNESCO Convention and to “propose the adoption of 
uniform laws throughout all states regarding cultural property.”119 Stat-
ing as one of its purposes “to study means and methods for modernizing, 
harmonizing, and coordinating private and in particular commercial law 
as between States and groups of States,”120 UNIDROIT formulated the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, with key goals “to return cultural property 
to its rightful owners and to reduce the profitability of illicit traffic in 
art.”121 
The UNIDROIT Convention aims to “enhance [the UNESCO Conven-
tion’s] effectiveness by ensuring that all states, civil and common law 
jurisdictions alike, apply a uniform body of cultural property law.”122 
                                                                                                                                  
 113. Vitale, supra note 43, at 1847. 
 114. See Cutting, supra note 20, at 960. 
 115. Id. at 969. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 944. 
 118. See Siehr, supra note 61, at 1078. “Also, this Convention does not formulate an 
independent supranational policy of international art trade, restricts itself to the interna-
tional enforcement of national export prohibitions, and, of course, entitles the bona fide 
possessor to reasonable compensation under Article 6.” Id. 
 119. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 461. 
 120. Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 133 n.124. 
 121. Lehman, supra note 46, at 543. 
 122. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 461. 
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The treaty is designed such that all countries with implementing legisla-
tion will follow the uniform law dictated by the provisions of the treaty, 
as member countries must implement all of the provisions.123 As such, 
the treaty aims to harmonize “private laws of various states so as to re-
duce the harmful effects that occur when laws conflict,”124 and the 
preamble to the UNIDROIT Convention emphasizes this determination, 
stating as its aim “to contribute effectively to the fight against illicit trade 
in cultural objects by taking the important step of establishing common, 
minimal legal rules for the restitution and return of cultural objects be-
tween Contracting States.”125 Accordingly, “the most likely result for 
those who ratify will be that the wide assortment of laws currently go-
verning ownership rights in cultural property will be preempted and sub-
stantially harmonized in a single source.”126 Thus, the greatest strength of 
the UNIDROIT Convention is its goal of creating a uniform body of in-
ternational law through “harmonization” of international law, and, if 
widely implemented, the treaty would likely provide an innovative and 
successful means of protecting cultural property.127 
A. UNIDROIT Convention Text and Format 
The UNIDROIT Convention is divided into several chapters consisting 
of separate articles, and the organization is clearer than that of the 
UNESCO Convention so its provisions are easier to understand and thus 
potentially easier to apply.128 The UNIDROIT Convention provides the 
framework for a uniform law among all member parties, meaning that 
once laws are implemented in accordance with the treaty and harmonized 
into one source, dictated by the treaty, parties affected by cultural proper-
                                                                                                                                  
 123. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 18. 
 124. Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 133. 
 125. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, pmbl. One clause of the preamble states: 
DETERMINED to contribute effectively to the fight against illicit trade in cul-
tural objects by taking the important step of establishing common, minimal le-
gal rules for the restitution and return of cultural objects between Contracting 
States, with the objective of improving the preservation and protection of the 
cultural heritage in the interest of all. 
Id. 
 126. Lehman, supra note 46, at 545. 
 127. Fincham, Lex Originis Rule, supra note 1, at 134. The UNIDROIT Convention 
“recognizes the inherent difficulty in relying on developing nations to police their own 
borders and archaeological sites.” Id. 
 128. See Kinderman, supra note 48, at 504. 
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ty theft could likely “consult this single source to determine the legality 
and prudence of certain transactions under consideration.”129 
Article 1 of the UNIDROIT Convention discusses the scope of the 
treaty, marking a significant departure from the UNESCO Convention’s 
treatment of cultural property. Rather than combining all cultural proper-
ty into one category, as the UNESCO Convention does, the UNIDROIT 
Convention uses Article 1 to divide its application into the distinct cate-
gories of “stolen objects” and “cultural objects illegally removed” from a 
country,130 recognizing “that these two areas, while closely related, pose 
distinct problems.”131 This distinction also represents an important 
movement toward improving the laws because it gives a special status to 
cultural property, seen in Article 2, separating it from objects of little or 
no cultural significance.132 As discussed earlier, Article 2 defines cultural 
property and includes a list of categories in the Annex to the Convention 
that cover all objects that can be classified as cultural property.133 The 
                                                                                                                                  
 129. Lehman, supra note 46, at 545. 
 130. Kinderman, supra note 48, at 504–05; see UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 
16, art. 1. Article 1 states that “[t]his Convention applies to claims of an international 
character for: (a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects; (b) the return of cultural objects 
removed from the territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the export 
of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural heritage . . . .” Id. 
 131. Id. at 505. 
 132. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 2. 
 133. See id. annex. “[C]ultural objects are those which, on religious or secular grounds, 
are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and be-
long to one of the categories listed in the Annex to this Convention.” Id. The Annex lists: 
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and 
objects of palaeontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including 
the history of science and technology and military and social history, to the life 
of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national im-
portance; (c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; (d) elements of artistic or histori-
cal monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered; (e) an-
tiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and en-
graved seals; (f) objects of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, 
such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any 
support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manu-
factured articles decorated by hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; 
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definition eliminates “vague” or “overbroad” definitions of what is pro-
tected, as it includes only chattels,134 but the most notable aspect of the 
definition of cultural property is that it “validates cultural property as a 
unique type of property subject to distinctive property laws.”135 Further, 
the UNIDROIT Convention, unlike the UNESCO Convention, does not 
allow each state to designate its own items of cultural significance, as it 
provides an extensive definition of cultural property136 that helps to 
maintain uniformity. 
Chapter II, “Restitution of Stolen Cultural Objects,” discusses what 
constitutes a stolen cultural object, the requirements of due diligence in 
returning stolen objects, statutes of limitations, and compensation to the 
possessor.137 Article 3(2) explains that a stolen cultural object for pur-
poses of the Convention shall include an object “which has been unlaw-
fully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained.”138 As 
will be discussed in detail below,139 Article 3 requires “the possessor of a 
cultural object which has been stolen [to] return it,”140 reversing the 
common assumption that a bona fide purchaser will attain good title.141 
Rather, Article 4 provides for restitution to good faith purchasers who 
exercise due diligence, but there is no option to retain good title.142 The 
due diligence requirement is, however, broad, and UNIDROIT mandates 
                                                                                                                                  
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of 
special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collec-
tions; (i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; (k) 
articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical instru-
ments. 
Id. 
 134. See Cottrell, supra note 49, at 643. 
 135. Phelan, supra note 44, at 45. 
 136. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, annex. 
 137. See id. ch. II. This Chapter contains Articles 3 and 4, which both deal exclusively 
with stolen cultural objects. 
 138. Id. art. 3(2). 
 139. See infra Part V.C. 
 140. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 3(1). 
 141. Lenzner, supra note 72, at 496. 
 142. Article 4(1) states: 
The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it shall be entitled, at 
the time of its restitution, to payment of fair and reasonable compensation pro-
vided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known that 
the object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence when acquir-
ing the object. 
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, art. 4(1). 
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that all “circumstances of the acquisition” be considered, further encour-
aging judicial discretion.143 In addition, Article 3 provides for a three-
year statute of limitations “from the time when the claimant knew the 
location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any 
case within a period of fifty years from the time of the theft.”144 Further, 
Article 3(5) permits a member state to extend the statute of limitations to 
seventy-five years or “such longer period as is provided in its law,” al-
lowing the requirement to also fall within a country’s discretion.145 Thus, 
although the treaty requires that a signatory implement all provisions, 
some discretion will be permitted. 
With a structure parallel to that of Chapter II, Chapter III provides pro-
visions concerning the return of illegally exported cultural property, de-
fined as a 
cultural object which has been temporarily exported from the territory 
of the requesting State, for purposes such as exhibition, research or res-
toration, under a permit issued according to its law regulating its export 
for the purpose of protecting its cultural heritage and not returned in 
accordance with the terms of that permit.146 
This distinction between stolen and illegally exported cultural property 
provides a more comprehensive and thorough way of dealing with cul-
tural property, as it provides provisions that cover broader situations.147 
Further, in contrast to the Article 3 demand that a possessor of stolen 
cultural property return it, Article 5(1) explains that a “Contracting State 
                                                                                                                                  
 143. Article 4(4) states: 
In determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard shall be 
had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of the 
parties, the price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessi-
ble register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant information and 
documentation which it could reasonably have obtained, and whether the pos-
sessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable 
person would have taken in the circumstances. 
Id. art. 4(4). 
 144. Id. art. 3(3). 
 145. Id. art. 3(5). 
 146. Id. art. 5(2). 
 147. See, however, id. ch. III, for a list of provisions regarding the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects (this Chapter contains Articles 5, 6 and 7). Further, “[a]lthough 
the UNESCO Convention addresses the restitution of cultural property exported contrary 
to a state’s legislation, no standard exists to determine precisely which types of property 
constitute works of ‘great cultural significance.’” Kinderman, supra note 48, at 508–09. 
In addition, see UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 16, ch. III, for the articles that ad-
dress illegally exported cultural objects. 
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may request the court or other competent authority of another Contract-
ing State to order the return of a cultural object illegally exported from 
the territory of the requesting State.”148 This recognizes the need for 
member states to work together to ensure that cultural property is pro-
tected to the highest possible extent, adding to the variety of situations 
for which UNIDROIT accounts. 
Finally, Chapters IV and V provide general and final provisions, re-
spectively. Article 8 of Chapter IV explains where claimants may bring 
suit, providing that a 
claim under Chapter II and a request under Chapter III may be brought 
before the courts or other competent authorities of the Contracting State 
where the cultural object is located, in addition to the courts or other 
competent authorities otherwise having jurisdiction under the rules in 
force in Contracting States.149 
Further, Chapter IV includes a provision that expands another UNESCO 
Convention limitation by allowing “private parties [in addition to mem-
ber states] to initiate restitution” of “stolen or illegally exported ob-
jects.”150 Also noteworthy, as mentioned before, is Article 18, which re-
quires member parties to accept all of the UNIDROIT Convention provi-
sions, stating that “[n]o reservations are permitted except those expressly 
authorised [sic] in this Convention.”151 Through this final requirement, 
member parties can be certain that their laws will be uniform with any 
other countries that ratify the Convention, and thus the overall structure 
of the treaty supports the creation of uniform international law. 
B. UNIDROIT Convention Criticism 
Some weaknesses may explain why many market countries have de-
clined to ratify the UNIDROIT Convention.152 The main criticism is of 
Article 18, ironically, which is written such that “if states were wary of 
certain provisions of the Convention, they could not sign on to other pro-
visions which they found effective.”153 Essentially, because the treaty 
allows “no reservations,”154 potential member states are concerned with 
committing to each provision without the ability to eliminate any provi-
                                                                                                                                  
 148. Id. art. 5(1). 
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sions that they find problematic. However, the provision demands con-
sideration of the UNESCO Convention’s failure to promote adherence to 
uniform law,155 and countries must recognize the importance of main-
taining consistent regulations and legislation. As this lack of uniformity 
was one of the fatal flaws of the UNESCO Convention,156 the need for 
Article 18 of the UNIDROIT Convention is clear. Further, because some 
UNIDROIT Convention provisions permit and even encourage judicial 
discretion, the treaty is not as absolute as it seems. As this provision spe-
cifically ensures the creation of uniform law, it is necessary in order for 
the treaty to provide a successful framework for protecting cultural prop-
erty and decreasing theft. 
In addition, some critics argue that two of the treaty’s provisions, 
Chapter II Article 3(2) and Chapter III Article 5(3), appear to conflict, 
raising questions as to the intended meaning of each provision.157 The 
relevant portion of Article 3(2) states, “a cultural object which has been 
unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall 
be considered stolen, when consistent with the law of the State where the 
excavation took place.”158 Article 5(3) is more detailed and provides that 
the court or authority of a member country “shall order the return of an 
illegally exported cultural object if the requesting State establishes that 
the removal of the object from its territory significantly impairs” one of 
four enumerated “interests,”159 in effect establishing a “limited right of 
return.”160 First, Article 3(2) “is arguably unnecessary because, like Ar-
ticle 5(3), it provides for return, but, unlike Article 5(3), it is an all-
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 156. See id. 
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encompassing, streamlined return provision.”161 Another concern with 
Article 3(2) is that it provides no protection where a compelling interest 
conflicts with the enforcement of certain “foreign ownership declara-
tions,”162 and it only requires member parties to recognize foreign own-
ership declarations in certain circumstances. 
Although these are legitimate criticisms with respect to the treaty, Ar-
ticle 3(2) applies only to “excavated” objects and not objects falling 
within “the terms of a source nation’s generic ownership law.”163 This 
means that many cultural objects will not fall within the broad reach of 
Article 3(2),164 perhaps mitigating some concerns. There are also no spe-
cifications as to what provision a country must choose in litigation, so it 
is hopeful that countries will be free to apply Article 5(3)165 where there 
are “legitimate international interests” at stake, as the limited right of 
return laid out in Article 5(3) is an “idea with great promise.”166 In addi-
tion, since Article 4 provides for restitution to good faith purchasers, 
there is some additional protection in certain circumstances.167 Finally, it 
is important to note that these two provisions fall under separate chapters 
that deal with defining and regulating separate categories of cultural 
property168 that earlier treaties failed to distinguish—stolen cultural ob-
jects and illegally exported cultural objects.169 This distinction follows 
naturally from the UNIDROIT Convention ideal of consistently promot-
ing international interests, and the treaty promotes these interests and is 
comprehensive by covering both categories of cultural property. 
Some critics of the UNIDROIT Convention have also argued that im-
plementing legislation could bring rise to complex litigation,170 noting 
the issues that might arise from creating a uniform framework while still 
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allowing for concurrent private action.171 However, other scholars argue 
that some of these criticisms seem “unfair and exaggerated,”172 and 
hopefully the uniform framework among member parties will ensure that 
private actions are not inconsistent with public results. Essentially, the 
UNIDROIT Convention simply allows for private parties, in addition to 
member states, to bring suits, but this does not conflict with the tenet of 
maintaining uniform law as provided through the treaty.173 Rather, it re-
cognizes that both individuals and member states may need to bring ac-
tions, ensuring wider protection of cultural property while maintaining 
similar, uniform laws throughout the member states. As such, many pro-
visions of the UNIDROIT Convention simply expand upon some of the 
successful provisions of the UNESCO Convention while eliminating the 
problematic provisions. If market countries ratify the UNIDROIT Con-
vention and embrace a system of uniform law, the potential for protec-
tion would increase dramatically and the criticisms would hopefully dis-
appear. 
C. Why UNIDROIT: Advantages 
The potential for protecting cultural property through uniform law and 
reconciling the “differences between civil and common law nations”174 
outweighs the shortcomings of the UNIDROIT Convention.175 First, as 
mentioned earlier, the uniform law provided by the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion would most likely ensure that the “motley assortment of laws cur-
rently governing ownership rights in cultural property will be 
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preempted,” harmonizing laws among all nations.176 Although the treaty 
does not explicitly state that national laws will be preempted, the creation 
of uniform law would most likely demand this result, especially because 
countries would presumably follow the newly implemented legislation. 
Another advantage of the UNIDROIT Convention is that it ensures 
maximum protection of cultural property, as several provisions encour-
age judicial discretion in certain instances by listing important considera-
tions or pointing to the applicable law of a contracting state.177 Further, 
countries can be assured that the treaty is in their best interests because 
the UNIDROIT Convention states that “[n]othing in this Convention 
shall prevent a Contracting State from applying any rules more favoura-
ble [sic] to the restitution or the return of stolen or illegally exported cul-
tural objects than provided for by this Convention.”178 Thus, these provi-
sions provide assurance that courts would retain discretion in determin-
ing how to proceed in certain cases, and thus the treaty promotes uniform 
law without being unrealistically absolute. 
Further, many other principles of the UNIDROIT Convention mark 
significant changes from the UNESCO Convention that will serve to de-
crease cultural property theft. For example, one of the most important 
departures from the UNESCO Convention is that UNIDROIT expands 
the pool of claimants permitted to initiate restitution for stolen cultural 
property to include private individuals in addition to member states.179 In 
response to the “new, insidious black market for cultural property,” 
UNIDROIT follows through with “a new legislative response . . . that 
recognizes individuals, not states, as the primary actors in cultural prop-
erty theft.”180 This will ensure greater protection of cultural property by 
widening the class of potential claimants and hopefully decreasing the 
number of thefts that occur in general. Further, the treaty mandates that a 
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“bona fide purchaser of stolen objects will not receive good title,”181 re-
quiring the purchaser to return the object in exchange for reasonable 
compensation as long as the purchase was made in good faith.182 As both 
of these provisions protect possessors and good faith purchasers, albeit in 
different ways, they have the potential to significantly deter cultural 
property theft, or at least provide appropriate restitution. 
Chapter II of the UNIDROIT Convention encompasses specific guide-
lines for dealing with stolen cultural property, restitution, and compensa-
tion to good faith purchasers, and these provisions provide fair and rea-
sonable protection for all parties involved in cultural property disputes. 
However, a particularly important requirement of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention is that it places an extremely important focus on the return of 
stolen cultural property. Aiming to ensure restitution in all cases by re-
quiring “cultural property to be returned even if a theft cannot be firmly 
established,”183 Article 3(1) commands that a “possessor of a cultural 
object which has been stolen shall return it.”184 Regardless of the good 
faith of the purchaser185 or any other circumstances, the possessor is ob-
ligated to return the object, subject to a three-year statute of limitations 
for bringing a claim for restitution.186 This provision is thorough in that it 
protects original owners by requiring possessors to return stolen cultural 
property, but it also “insures some security for the possessor by setting 
the limitations period” within which “the original owner can bring a 
claim.”187 The statute of limitations set forth in the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion also represents “a compromise to the competing source and market 
nation interests,” further supporting that these countries should accede to 
the treaty.188 
In addition, Article 4 mandates that a possessor who is required to re-
turn stolen property shall be entitled to “fair and reasonable compensa-
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tion provided that the possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to 
have known that the object was stolen.”189 This provision is particularly 
relevant to encouraging civil law nations to become signatories, as in 
“civil law nations the good faith purchaser is allowed to retain the stolen 
property” while the UNIDROIT Convention is focused primarily on “se-
curing the return of stolen cultural property.”190 Since this difference be-
tween the law of civil nations and the law required by the UNIDROIT 
Convention is somewhat dramatic, “[p]roviding reasonable compensa-
tion serves to reduce the shock of transition from complete protection of 
the good faith purchaser to almost no protection.”191 Thus, UNIDROIT 
seems to strike a fair balance between certain aspects of common law 
and civil law rules. 
Article 4 also states that the possessor must “prove that it exercised due 
diligence when acquiring the object”192 in order to obtain compensation, 
but the “intentionally vague” language of the provision encourages judi-
cial discretion, again demonstrating how the treaty requires uniform law 
without being too extreme.193 This clause and the “fair and reasonable 
compensation” requirement are both somewhat vague, allowing for more 
judicial discretion depending on the circumstances of the theft. Further, 
since the good faith purchaser receives no protection in a common law 
jurisdiction, the UNIDROIT Convention requirement of due diligence 
“would, therefore, be an unexpected bonus to the current possessor.”194 
This provision as a whole is potentially successful in that it would argua-
bly increase due diligence of parties acquiring cultural objects, expand 
the protection that is currently afforded to cultural property owners, and 
ensure restitution in appropriate cases. 
Through its provisions, specifically in Articles 3 and 4, the 
UNIDROIT Convention is “consistent with existing international law 
and U.S. domestic law,” and provides “an equitable solution to the com-
plex issues involved in art theft cases.”195 Although the criticisms of the 
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UNIDROIT Convention are not without merit, the treaty “takes signifi-
cant steps toward reconciling existing tensions between market and 
source nations, and between the civil and common law countries by pro-
tecting both the rights of the original owner and of the bona fide pur-
chaser.”196 Because there are often conflicting rights, the UNIDROIT 
Convention’s attempt at reconciling those conflicts, harmonizing private 
law, and creating a uniform body of international law is a huge step to-
ward protecting cultural property. Although there is no flawless interna-
tional treaty protecting cultural property, the UNIDROIT Convention 
“provides a glimmer of hope for increased regulation of a market that has 
become a virtual free-for-all”197 and may be the closest the international 
community will see. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although the importance of cultural property demands laws that will 
truly protect it, there is currently no legal system that has effectively 
done so. While the UNESCO Convention ignores the need for uniform 
law and permits individual countries to maintain varying domestic laws 
concerning stolen cultural property, domestic laws still do not provide 
adequate protection. Further, since cultural property theft has historically 
been regulated on the domestic scale, many countries have resisted the 
movement toward a more uniform, international system of regulation like 
the one set forth in the UNIDROIT Convention. 
However, recognizing the need for uniform law is imperative, and im-
plementing the UNIDROIT Convention “would confirm the special sta-
tus of cultural property and, hopefully, would provide the additional im-
petus currently needed for adequate international cooperation in the pre-
servation and protection of the world’s cultural treasures.”198 Further, it 
would provide a means of deterring cultural property theft without se-
verely complicating the art market, as it successfully expands upon the 
positive provisions of the UNESCO Convention while eliminating the 
unsuccessful ones.199 The problem of stolen cultural property has to date 
“been unchecked due to the lack of an effective international agree-
ment,”200 and the UNIDROIT Convention provides a uniform, interna-
tional framework for protection. Although arguments have been made 
that the lack of “sufficient ratification and application” is a sign of the 
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UNIDROIT Convention’s failure,201 more widespread ratification, at 
least in the near future, seems more plausible than ratification of a new 
treaty. As such, the next step in the right direction toward protecting cul-
tural property is large market country implementation of the UNIDROIT 
Convention and thus implementation of a widely uniform international 
law.  
“Nations, both market and source, need to adopt a spirit of compromise 
regarding cultural property regulation,” and the “UNIDROIT Convention 
provides a framework for that compromise.”202 This compromise is par-
ticularly important, as both market and source countries should recognize 
and acknowledge the innovative approaches of the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion for protecting cultural property through uniform law. Although the 
criticisms are not “a surprising reaction to any effort to seriously modify 
the art trade,”203 the UNIDROIT Convention solutions for protecting cul-
tural property are unparalleled, and the creation of uniform law is the 
primary highlight. 
As discussed throughout this Note, no treaty or national legislation has 
proven successful in dealing with stolen cultural property and its effects. 
As members of the international community have created successful “in-
ternational regimes to deal with other areas,” cultural property laws 
“should be addressed in a similar manner.”204 Cultural property theft is a 
global problem that has yet to noticeably decline, as a truly successful 
framework for protection has not been implemented. Although countries 
have natural reservations against implementing new legislation that 
might seriously affect their legal systems, cultural property theft is not a 
self-regulating area and now is the time to address it. Large market coun-
tries should support ratification of the UNIDROIT Convention and its 
uniform framework, which, despite criticism, still appears to have poten-
tial for long-term success in deterring and decreasing cultural property 
theft. 
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